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Abstract 
 
Over the past few decades there has been a turn toward ‘the everyday’ in the social sciences 
and humanities. For some authors, this turn is about making the everyday a new repository of 
authority of some sort, political, social, cultural or otherwise. For others, however, any turn toward 
the everyday interrupts any such evaluation. Focusing upon Stanley Cavell and the philosophical 
lineage that he continues from Emerson, Nietzsche, Thoreau and Wittgenstein, this paper 
examines Cavell’s interest in the menace and power of scepticism as key to understanding the 
everyday as a lived experience. As an introduction to this particular part of Cavell’s work for many 
Geographers, the paper puts Cavell in relation to more familiar approaches to the everyday, 
including de Certeau, critical Human Geography, non-representational theory, affect theory, 
psychoanalysis and pragmatism. 
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1. The everyday turn and scepticism 
 
‘‘‘everyday life’ has been widely referenced and problematized in recent years within geography 
and many of the social sciences and humanities.” 
[Gregory et al., 2011: 223] 
 
The everyday turn has formed a grounding for a broad range of theories and approaches 
emerging in Human Geography over the past few decades. Historically implicated in the long 
cultural turn and the shift from structuralism to post-structuralism, today the everyday runs through 
an assortment of new approaches in Human Geography. From de Certeau’s (1984) seminal The 
Practice of Everyday Life, to more recently in critical Human Geography (Barnett, 2005), non-
representational theory (Harrison, 2002; Thrift, 2008), affect theory (Connolly, 2006; Massumi, 
2015), psychoanalysis (Pile, 1996; Blum and Nast, 2000) and pragmatism (Wood and Smith, 2008; 
Wills and Lake, 2017), the everyday continues to weave its way through many of our key concerns 
(Eyles, 1989; Crang, 2000; Gregory et al., 2011). This paper explores the Philosopher Stanley 
Cavell’s particular engagement with ‘the everyday’ and puts this in relation to these key debates in 
contemporary Human Geography. As Rorty (2005) says, over the past sixty years Cavell has 
developed a particularly innovative way of approaching the everyday; which, unlike many 
contemporary debates, maintains a much more explicit connection with Western Philosophy’s 
foundational interest in the sceptical problem of other minds and the external world.1 As Cavell 
(2005a: 159) recurrently emphasises, it was this long tradition of scepticism, from Socrates to 
                                                                        
1 A good example of this is Wittgenstein’s (1953: §253) sceptical statement: ‘‘I have seen a person in a discussion on 
this subject strike himself on the breast and say ‘‘But surely another person cannot have THIS pain!”. Wittgenstein’s 
point, as explained in this paper, is that the answer cannot be affirmed or denied with certainty; but rather the associated 
drive for the transcendental can become constitutive of a sense of illusionary qualities, rupture and impasse in human 
sociality and the everyday as a lived experience. For Cavell, Wittgenstein then reworks, but also continues, the Western 
tradition of philosophical scepticism that goes back to Socrates. 
Descartes, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, which for most of the history of Western Philosophy 
energised ‘‘our fundamental concerns about our relation to the world” and others in it. Yet, as Rorty 
and Cavell also say, these are not now the sorts of concerns that animate much contemporary 
debate about the everyday in the wider social sciences and humanities. Cavell has had some impact 
beyond Philosophy in the fields of Anthropology (Das, 1998), Political Theory (Mouffe, 2000; Rorty, 
2005; Berlant, 2011) and Film and Literature Studies (Eldridge and Rhie, 2011). However, there is 
no article in a major geography journal that takes Cavell’s work as its central focus and running 
concern throughout. Those Geographers who have drawn upon Cavell to influence their own fields 
of research in such areas as critical geography, justice and planning most notably include Barnett 
(2004, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2014), Laurier (2011, 2012), Laurier and Brown (2008), Laurier and 
Lorimer (2007, 2012) and a few others (Entrikin, 2002; Hillier, 2006; Gunder and Hillier, 2007; Pugh, 
2013). This paper systematically places Cavell’s work in relation to a broad range of key themes in 
contemporary Human Geography and the everyday – specifically, de Certeau, critical Human 
Geography, non-representational theory, affect theory, psychoanalysis and pragmatism. 
 
 
2. De Certeau and Cavell 
 
Michel de Certeau’s (1984) The Practice of Everyday Life is one of the key historical texts to have 
shaped the ‘everyday turn’ over the past few decades. Like Lefebvre’s (2002) Critique of Everyday 
Life, Highmore’s (2002) Everyday Life and Cultural Theory and Thrift’s (2008) Non-
Representational Theory, this book is among the most formative and frequently cited in geography 
and related disciplines. As Mike Crang (2000: 136) says, de Certeau is a good place to begin any 
reflection on what we mean by ‘the everyday’ in geography, as he has become something of a 
‘‘small-scale mantra in geographical writings”. In particular, de Certeau’s invocation to turn away 
from geography ‘on high’ still makes him, for many Geographers, ‘‘the champion of the common 
folk and street level social theory” (Crang, 2000:136; Kwan, 2013; Saunders and Moles, 2013). De 
Certeau has played a key role in the everyday turn in Human Geography (McDowell, 1994; Nash, 
2000; Lorimer, 2005). He has influenced mainstream definitions, such as in the Dictionary of Human 
Geography, which defines ‘‘everyday life” as 
 
‘‘A realm associated with ordinary, routine and repetitive aspects of social life that are pervasive 
and yet frequently overlooked and taken-for-granted. For many commentators, the everyday is 
inherently ambiguous and indeterminate, something that is both everywhere yet nowhere, familiar 
at the same time as it escapes.” 
[Gregory et al., 2011: 223] 
 
 
But here we can schematically pick out at least two ways of approaching the everyday that allow 
us to bring the work of Cavell to light. On the one hand, there is de Certeau’s (1984) grounding of 
authority in the everyday that amounts to something like a kind of therapy against the longstanding 
abstractions and Idealisms of Philosopher Kings, Metaphysics and Transcendental Reason that 
have permeated the Western Philosophical tradition since before Plato. Here de Certeau (1997: 22) 
says: 
 
‘‘A theory which takes as its theme, (and often for a taboo) ‘what is happening’ would be precisely 
the means of eliminating what is happening here and now. It would be discretely but surely ... 
since the heterogeneous element has been a priori eliminated”. 
 
De Certeau’s approach to the everyday famously focuses upon how the metaphysical freezes out 
the critical pluralities and heterogeneity of everyday life, and he therefore says we should submit to 
the authority of the ordinary rather than the abstractions of Philosopher Kings and Transcendental 
Reason. But on the other hand, there are less read philosophical traditions, such as those engaged 
by Cavell (but which also include Emerson, Thoreau, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Berlant see 
below) that adopt a very different way of approaching the everyday. Unlike de Certeau, this different 
philosophical lineage does not invoke the authority of ‘the everyday’ to sceptically stress pluralities 
and distribution of agency in everyday life at the expense of the metaphysical drive, precisely 
because this can work to denude the everyday of its more critical capacities. Instead, in Cavell in 
particular, an engagement with scepticism and the associated drive for the transcendental is bound 
up in a radically different and distinct way of approaching the everyday. This more critically brings 
to the fore how a sense of non-identity and illusionary qualities become constitutive of the everyday 
itself as a lived experience – a sense of absence, loss or disconnection from the everyday, from 
which a sense of self and community may recover from, or otherwise. As we will see later, Cavell’s 
foregrounding of such states of suspension as everyday experiences further makes his work 
appealing for more recent contemporary theorists of the everyday, such as Lauren Berlant (2011: 
260), who argues that a ‘‘Cavellian ethics” is a means of telling stories about trying to reconstruct a 
sense of self and/or community, whilst living through feelings of ongoing impasse and wandering 
absorptiveness. But when it comes to Cavell in particular make absolutely no mistake about the 
fundamental stakes at hand in his approach to the everyday and associated key tropes of impasse 
and suspension. Cavell’s (1996a) central and recurrent argument is that the sceptical problem of 
other minds, the external world and associated critical capacities cannot be expunged from our 
experiences of the everyday, precisely because, as I now explain, scepticism is part and parcel of 
the human form of life. 
 
A useful way to bring this out is to stay with a comparison between de Certeau and Cavell. Both 
begin their analysis of the everyday with Wittgenstein, but they make very different readings of 
undoubtedly the most important Philosopher to have shaped the everyday turn in the early 20th 
century. In the opening pages of The Practice of Everyday Life de Certeau (1984: 9) singles out, 
credits and applauds Wittgenstein as the ‘‘Hercules” who, through his turn toward ordinary language 
philosophy, cleared the pathway for what was eventually to become the everyday turn. In particular 
for de Certeau (1984: 9), Wittgenstein invoked the everyday as a ‘‘critique of the Philosopher as 
Expert”, casting out the realms of Transcendental Reason, Metaphysics and Philosopher Kings 
from our analysis of the everyday so that we focused instead upon the mundane and the ordinary 
(see also Pugh, 2012). As de Certeau (1984: 9, emphasis in original) says, after Wittgenstein, 
‘‘henceforth” there should be a ‘‘submission to the ordinary”. However, I contend, there is a 
fundamental problem with de Certeau’s reading of Wittgenstein and his understanding of the 
everyday which also works to draw out the distinctiveness of Cavell’s approach. In particular, the 
problem with de Certeau’s reading is not what he does say, but what he leaves out or reads out of 
Wittgenstein that Cavell insists should remain and be kept in play. For allowing de Certeau his point 
that the metaphysical acts to freeze out the critical pluralities of the everyday, the question for Cavell 
still remains: how is it that this sceptical impulse away from the authority of everyday, that drive to 
make transcendental, does still remain in play; and, indeed, quite naturally becomes constitutive of 
the everyday as a lived experience? Moreover, are there not many conceivable contexts and 
circumstances where to gloss over the sceptical problem and the associated transcendental drive 
would be to deny the very conditions of alienation, exile and oppression that brought scepticism 
about in the first place; leaving us a mystery to ourselves, let alone the world? (Cavell, 1972/1981; 
Affeldt, 1998; 2010; Laugier, 2009; 2013). Thus, for Cavell (1988: 170), ‘‘[i]t seems to me that the 
originality of [Wittgenstein’s] Investigations is a function of the originality of its response to 
scepticism, one that undertakes not to deny scepticism’s power (on the contrary) but to diagnose 
the source (say the possibility) of that power” as it becomes constitutive of the everyday. Here 
Wittgenstein ‘‘has as fully worked out a theory of how language becomes metaphysical as he does 
of how language becomes ordinary.” (Cavell, 1994: 6–7). Picking up on this, in Cavell’s wide ranging 
studies – from his critiques of dominant philosophical traditions, to his work in film and literature – 
what is therefore recurrently at stake is this radical concern with the sceptical impulse, associated 
transcendental limits and how people find their way back to each other; acknowledging each other, 
somehow, or otherwise, in the midst of exile, separateness and finitude. Scepticism and the 
associated drive to exile from the ordinary is not a problem to be avoided or read out of how we 
approach the everyday, because, unlike de Certeau’s reading of Wittgenstein, Cavell (1994, 2005b) 
does not so much understand Wittgenstein to be grounding authority in the everyday, as taking a 
more direct interest in how the sceptical impulse and drive to sublime – in justice, pain, or love, for 
examples – emerges quite naturally out of everyday situations and contexts. 
 
We can start to clarify the distinctiveness of the approach, as Cavell (1969) does, with an example 
from Wittgenstein’s (1953: §253) famous case of an everyday use of the word ‘‘pain”: 
 
‘‘I have seen a person in a discussion on this subject strike himself on the breast and say ‘‘But 
surely another person cannot have THIS pain!” 
 
On the one hand, we could not possibly provide this person with the certain knowledge that we do 
share their pain (in the sense of grasping the certainty of the meaning of the world). But on the 
other, referring to social or cultural expressions of pain alone (or more sophisticatedly, as in 
Agamben or Foucault, examining the societal power relations that construct knowledge) does not 
get us much further either, in actually being able to give this person an answer to their sceptical and 
alienating question. Yet, despite this apparent gap or failing in our relation to others and the world, 
Cavell (2010a: 93) firmly maintains that we are still ‘‘right to look for a sense of essence or necessity 
in our concepts”, only we are apt to look in the wrong place. Here it is not the authority of the 
everyday but scepticism that is the ‘‘discovery of the everyday, a discovery of exactly what it is that 
scepticism would deny” (Cavell, 1988: 170). In the case of the above sceptic’s question about pain, 
scepticism emerges as an ‘‘absence” or feeling of impasse in everyday human sociality, a loss or 
rupture in the everyday and the acknowledgment of others (Cavell, 2010a: 95, emphasis in original). 
For Cavell then, the sceptic’s turn to human sociality amounts to something like a confession, and 
a working through of these feelings of suspension and the illusionary qualities of the everyday (from 
which a sense of acknowledgment, self and wider social relations may recover, or otherwise). This 
is the radically different type of scepticism in Cavell’s work; different from a hermeneutics of 
suspicion or general critical wariness about other’s truth claims. In Cavell’s (1969: 248) work, 
scepticism is associated with the opening up of relation to others and the world: 
 
‘‘To meet the sceptic by saying that we can have the same feeling, fails; in failing, it [nevertheless] 
perpetuates the idea that whether we have the same feeling is relevant to whether we can know 
what another is feeling; but if this is taken as relevant, it is discovered that the sense in which we 
can have the same feeling is insufficient for knowing whether another person feels what I can 
feel, or feels anything at all. A gap has (apparently) been revealed ...” between ourselves and the 
world. 
 
What Cavell is therefore working toward more generally through this interest in scepticism is a 
different perspective of what it means to be critical in our engagements with the everyday. Today, 
critical theorists and Geographers are more likely to not engage the depths of this philosophical 
tradition of scepticism (e.g. Geertz, 2000; Goffman, 2002), whilst for Cavell scepticism and the 
associated drive for the transcendental is a means of telling stories about the illusionary qualities of 
the everyday. It is about trying to reconstruct community out of this sense of nonidentity, as a worthy 
endeavour, to be explored seriously (see also Emerson, 2000 and Nietzsche, 2003). In contrast to 
de Certeau, Cavell (2010a: 92) does not then easily align the everyday turn brought about by 
Wittgenstein with a turning away from the sceptical impulse and the drive for something 
transcendental, but rather says: 
 
‘‘This is what I take Wittgenstein to express in saying ‘‘What we do is lead words back from their 
metaphysical to everyday use” (Wittgenstein, 1953: §116), with the proviso that you might not, 
without reflection, or suggestion, tell when the metaphysical has intervened in our lives, as 
reported here for example: ‘‘I have seen a person ... strike himself on the breast and say: ‘But 
surely another person can’t have THIS pain!” (Wittgenstein, 1953: §253). But we live in the 
everyday before words are returned; we live then in exile from our words, and the return is never 
at rest.” 
 
Thus, for Cavell (e.g. 1994: 6–7, 2010a: 92), whereas Kant was only interested in the drive for a 
limited number of categories of reason, Wittgenstein was interested in how any word we speak may, 
and at any moment, reveal our separation from others and our inability to make ourselves 
intelligible. The invocation is not so much about just being critically wary of others, but to slow down 
and rake over the terms that we use to grasp everyday life; which, through Cavell’s reworking of the 
longstanding philosophical tradition and problem scepticism, are revealed at any moment to put our 
acknowledgment of each other and the world in doubt. As noted, he works such themes through a 
wide range of studies, from film and political theory to literature. The concerns are particularly well 
exemplified in Cavell’s (2003a) reading of Shakespeare, where in King Lear, Othello and Macbeth, 
for examples, a daughter’s expressions of love, a wife’s satisfaction, and the stability of a wife’s 
humanity all become manifestations of scepticism’s theme of world annihilating doubt (Das, 2007). 
These plays pivot upon how scepticism as a lived reality throws the everyday into doubt, and the 
question for the central characters becomes how, or whether, any sense of self, justice or 
community is to be recovered (Cavell, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1996b, 2003a; Fischer, 1989; Rothman 
and Keane, 2000; Eldridge and Rhie, 2011; for examples). But if the tone of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy is often noted as tortured (Affeldt, 2010), then here it seems to me that Cavell’s work is 
more obviously focused upon questions of tact and the subtleties of impasse in human relations. 
This is not to say that it lacks power, but that for Cavell the intricacies of acknowledgment of others 
are brought to the fore (see Barnett, 2005, 2008 below). As Hillier (2006) aptly remarks in her own 
work drawing upon Cavell, he has a particularly attuned sense that foregrounds how it is all too 
easy to avoid the uncertainties of human sociality. For many Human Geographers the everyday 
turn is about making the everyday a new repository of authority of some sort, political, social, cultural 
or otherwise. Eyles (1989: 103), for example, says that everyday life is ‘‘the plausible social context 
and believable personal world within which we reside”. However, for Cavell, the turn toward the 
everyday is not only about leaving the ivory tower and abstract theorising for the messiness and 
performative practices of the streets; it is also down, into the denial brought about by the power and 
menace of scepticism, and how scepticism is quite ordinarily and naturally woven into the social 
fabric of everyday life (Critchley, 2005). As we will now see, this raises some important questions 
for Human Geography – for debates in critical geography, non-representational theory, affect 
theory, psychoanalysis and pragmatism, as well in the work of Geographers including Clive Barnett, 
Eric Laurier, Paul Harrison, Nigel Thrift, Felicity Callard and many others. 
 
 
3. Critical Human Geography and Cavell: theories of injustice and resistance 
 
The foregrounding of scepticism in Cavell’s work has many implications. In his critique of Rawls 
(2009) Theory of Justice Cavell (1990) challenges Rawl’s famous normative argument – ‘‘Those 
who express resentment must be prepared to show why certain institutions are unjust or how others 
have injured them” (quoted in Cavell, 1990: 108). Cavell argues that Rawls is typical here of many 
in the social sciences and humanities today in tending to see justice as something that can be 
prescribed and governed like the rules of a game. The rules of a game allow games to be practiced 
and played, the intentions of players to be shaped, and their consequences confined and scored. 
When we play according to the rules of a game the limits of responsiveness and of what is 
permissible are known in advance. But when it comes to questions of moral judgment in everyday 
life, this can be precisely the problem. As Cavell (1990: 113, emphasis in original) says, the moral 
life is not governed 
 
‘‘by a rule but only by a judgment of moral finality, one that may be competently opposed, whose 
content may then enter into a moral argument, one whose resolution is not to be settled by appeal 
to a rule defining an institution; a judgment, hence, that carries consequences unforeseen or 
forsworn in games.” 
 
For some Human Geographers here Cavell has provided both a refreshing and appealing 
alternative approach to questions of everyday injustices and resistance. In his own formative work, 
Barnett (2016: 114) has developed an influential perspective within the field of Human Geography 
where an understanding of injustice 
 
‘‘does not involve calculating fair shares from a distance, nor an appreciation of philosophical 
arguments about shared capacities for reasoning, or indeed for suffering. It arises first and 
foremost from the difficult acceptance by a subject of their own of vulnerability, a response that 
arises in a scene of acknowledgment of the claims of others rather than in a knowing relation of 
what is right, or good, or justifiable.” 
 
What is important to recognise here is that Barnett builds this perspective of injustice from a serious 
engagement with Cavell’s work on scepticism and the everyday more generally, as exemplified in 
what has become a seminal paper in Human Geography in its own right entitled Ways of Relating: 
Hospitality and the acknowledgement of otherness (Barnett, 2005). Here Barnett (2005: 16) says 
that Cavell adopts 
 
‘‘a redemptive attitude toward philosophical scepticism, the moral of which, for Cavell (1979, 241), 
is that ‘‘the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, is 
not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing”. For Cavell, what exceeds 
knowledge in human relations is what demands acknowledgment. Acknowledging refers to a 
mode of relating to others that supplements the traditional privilege accorded to knowledge as 
the primary medium for relating to the world and others. Acknowledgment is therefore best 
understood as an ‘inflection of knowledge’ that arises in relation to appeals to which the 
appropriate response is not recognition, but rather the acknowledgment of suffering, the showing 
of sympathy, or just listening.” 
 
In Barnett’s influential work then, Cavell enables us to rework questions of justice and injustice in 
distinctively important ways, so that they are less framed around the certainties of rule-following, 
the coherences of knowledge and justice, than they are more vulnerable concerns with scepticism 
and acknowledgment. In this section of the paper I want to expand such concerns more widely to 
argue that such Cavellian-inspired approaches, which, above all, work to foreground how 
scepticism is ‘‘stitched into everyday life” (Das, 2007: 16), can raise some really important questions 
for a widespread critical tradition that influences Human Geography today. From Mbembé to 
Agamben and Schmitt, this critical tradition too straightforwardly projects a coherent sense of 
knowledge, control and sovereign subjectivity at work in everyday life and ‘‘onto events and 
decision-making” (Berlant, 2011:96). Berlant (2011: 96), a follower of Cavell herself, sees Achille 
Mbembé as ‘‘exemplary” of this tradition, as when Mbembé says ‘‘[t]o exercise sovereignty is to 
exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power”. 
Agamben too also focuses upon how ‘‘a biopolitical state can strip someone to what is bare or 
naked life that produces bodies that are killable with impunity” (Das, 2007: 16). Important as such 
critical approaches can be when making antagonistic political claims against oppressive forces, for 
Berlant (2011: 96), like Cavell, there are also dangers in casting the human ‘‘as most fully itself 
when assuming the spectacular posture of performative action” (see also Das, 1998). In contrast, 
the invocation in Cavell’s work on scepticism is to not only think about the social fabric of everyday 
life in terms of the illocutionary force of words, how conditions of felicity or infelicity can be met or 
are reparable through reference to social conventions and disciplinary rule-following (see also 
Laurier, 2012). It is not only to think of the social in terms of ‘‘performative utterances” that act as 
possible reference points that monitor social convention, rule-following, institutions and oppression, 
but also in terms of what Cavell (2005b: 185) calls ‘‘passionate utterances”. This is a technical term 
that Cavell develops in relation to Austin’s work on performative utterances, so that a ‘‘passionate 
utterance”, by contrast, is an expression of the limits of social convention and the absence of a 
standing language that puts our future together in doubt (Cavell, 2005b: 185). Or put another way, 
a passionate utterance for Cavell (2005b) points toward a possible spiritual, rather than intellectual, 
failure in our relationship with each other (see also Cavell, 1996a). As Laurier (2010:143, emphasis 
in original) says: 
 
‘‘Cavell draws out a contrasting set of conditions, an important one being that, with the 
passionate utterance there is no conventional procedure involved that will produce the desired 
effect for the speaker .... Without these pre-given roles the speaker must offer their standing 
with you and at the same time ‘single you out’. [Cavell, 2005: 181]” 
 
All this amounts to an understanding of social convention and rule following in everyday life, 
associated questions of injustice and suffering, that are not over-focused upon the disciplinary 
power of social conventions, institutional powers and forces (when compared to someone like 
Kripke, 1982). But are instead particularly attentive to the weaknesses brought about by scepticism 
as a lived experience. Cavell’s foregrounding of scepticism in this way is more cautious and 
tentative (compared to Mbembé, Agamben and Schmitt) about its critical abilities to ascribe 
fantasies of mastery over everyday life, the transmission of knowledge and societal rule-following. 
 
Before turning to the now perhaps obvious overlaps here between Cavell and non-
representational theory, such critical points can be briefly extended further in another direction when 
we consider how the everyday in the social sciences and humanities is now also often thought of 
as a site of creative resistance and hidden transcripts, as in the work of influential scholars like 
James Scott (1990) or Hans Joas (1996). Here I agree with one of Cavell’s most careful readers, 
Veena Das (1998: 183), that whilst these creative approaches have ‘‘the advantage of showing 
society to be constantly made rather than given. The problem is that the notion of the everyday is 
too easily secured in these ethnographies because they hardly ever consider the temptations and 
threats of scepticism as part of the lived reality and hence do not tell us what is the stake in the 
everyday that they discovered.” For Das, like the certainties in the work of someone like Agamden, 
Mbembé or Schmitt above, focusing too much upon the creativity of the everyday can also at times 
become too secure in its abilities to work around scepticism – from expressions, acknowledgments, 
or otherwise, of pain, trauma, grief, love and violence, to the everyday work of rumour and the state 
(see Das, 2007). For Das then, after Cavell, when we explore such contexts and circumstances 
where scepticism emerges and reconfigures social relations we are better able to attend to the 
stakes at hand. This of course does not deny that the everyday is creative (Scott), performative 
(Butler), and disciplinary (Agamden), among many other concerns, but it does bring more to the 
fore the role of scepticism in the fabric of everyday social life, exile and separation as well. 
 
 
4. Non-representational theory and Cavell 
 
Critical Human Geographers such as Eric Laurier have been interested in Cavell for some time 
(Laurier and Lorimer, 2007, 2012; Laurier and Brown, 2008; Laurier, 2011, 2012). The previous 
quote from Laurier is contained within his chapter contribution to Anderson and Harrison’s (2010) 
seminal edited text Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography. 
Nonrepresentational Theory (NRT), like Cavell, seeks to counteract a perceived over-reliance upon 
reductive approaches to language, social convention and rule following. NRT more particularly 
reorientates analysis toward the power of the nonrepresentational, nerve endings and affect (Thrift, 
2008). I will turn to affect theory itself more specifically shortly, but I want to start exploring 
similarities and differences from Cavell by foregrounding how, for key non-representational theorists 
including Nigel Thrift (1996) and Harrison (2002), as NRT was emerging in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, Wittgenstein too also played a useful role in justifying this non-representational turn. But as 
we shall see, the readings of Wittgenstein here were rather different from those made by Cavell. 
 
Laurier and Philo (2006) take Harrison’s (2002) paper ‘The Caesura: remarks on Wittgenstein’s 
interruption of theory, or, why practices elude explanation’ as emblematic of NRT as it was emerging 
at the beginning of the millennium. Throughout his paper Harrison (2002: 488) is positive about 
Wittgenstein, exploring in some detail how Wittgenstein can play an important role in ‘‘‘dissolving’ 
certain traditional conceptual dilemmas”. In particular, how Wittgenstein’s ‘‘work can give a different 
understanding of what to expect by and from an explanation and thereby intimate a different, 
perhaps suppler, more hospitable, way of going-on— one more attentive to and in acknowledgment 
of the eventful non-representational, and practical movements of understanding.” (Harrison, 2002: 
489, emphasis in original). Reflective of the more general concerns of the non-representational turn 
at this time of writing (see also Thrift, 1996), one key way in which Harrison believed that 
Wittgenstein could help NRT out is by exposing the Idealism, implicit or otherwise, associated with 
how social constructivism, realism, and many other philosophical traditions explain the world, and 
emphasise both the limitations of this narrow form of rule-following and instead turn us onto the 
performativity of practices. Here Harrison (2002: 491, emphasis in original), correctly in my opinion, 
takes on broad range of the social sciences and humanities as his target, saying 
 
‘‘that the idealism identified by Wittgenstein manifests itself in many modes of explanation, from 
constructivist to what we may broadly refer to as ‘realist’ (naıve or otherwise). All these modes 
share the basic presupposition that cultural activity is ‘guided’ by or is the ‘realisation’ of rules 
which lie behind actual events and thereby determine conduct in situ: rules which when 
uncovered or unmasked would serve to explain the constitution of meaningful activity as 
meaningful.” 
 
Going on to quote de Certeau, Harrison (2002: 494) says that such Idealistic approaches to 
understanding society and rule following ‘‘would be precisely the means of eliminating what is 
happening here and now”. Thinking back then, such concerns therefore also connect well to what I 
earlier said about de Certeau and how abstract understandings of rule-following freeze out the 
everyday and the gaze of Idealism becomes like a ‘‘Medusa” (Harrison, 2002: 494). I agree with all 
of this in Harrison’s Wittgenstein paper so far. However, from here on, crucially for Harrison, the 
response of NRT is not so much about how we could now rework scepticism more effectively, but, 
rather, to draw our attention to the ‘‘performative” nature of rule following in Wittgenstein (Harrison, 
2002: 495, emphasis in original). As Harrison (2002: 499, emphasis in original) explains with regard 
to the examples Wittgenstein employs in the Philosophical Investigations of how ordinary words are 
put to use: 
 
‘‘Wittgenstein directs us to scenes in which words, (gestures, propositions, poems, and so on) 
open directions for going-on. His style, the ‘scenic’ method, this giving of examples, is [an] attempt 
to illuminate the performative, practical and nonrepresentational nature of the acts of disclosing 
or Showing which give sense and resonance to what is Said. The difference which is being 
indicated here is between an analytic framework which treats words, (gestures, poems, and so 
on) as sequences of representations—as denotative—and one which acknowledges them as 
presentations—as disclosive.” 
 
NRT then takes us in a direction that adopts a particular therapeutic approach to the everyday; 
one that does not so much eschew representation, as is often claimed, as understand 
representation as disclosive and performative. Interestingly, leading Geographers have read the 
point that representation ‘‘may never succeed in fully capturing what an individual means, feels and 
thinks” in Harrison’s work, and NRT more generally, as possibly opening up a ‘‘gap [through which] 
scepticism squeezes its way back into our inquiries.” (Laurier and Philo, 2006: 355). But in his 
Wittgenstein paper I would say Harrison’s (2002) move is somewhat in a different direction. 
Harrison, more like Derrida than Wittgenstein, seems to be part of a different philosophical tradition 
that argues for the difficulty of escaping from Idealism. By contrast, scepticism, particularly as it is 
worked through in Cavell (1988: 175, emphasis in original), is about how we ‘‘cannot truly escape 
to” Idealism from the rough ground – that is, the emphasis is placed upon the impulse to ‘‘exile” and 
‘‘philosophical emptiness” as constitutive of the everyday as a scene of illusion (Cavell, 1996a: 326; 
Critchley, 2005). Here scepticism and the transcendental impulse ‘‘constitutes a rupture or break. It 
redirects attention. However, whilst it can seem otherwise, it does not direct attention toward 
anything. For in the place of an object of attention there is emptiness.” (Affeldt, 2010: 282). But this 
is why Cavell is so fundamental for how we can approach the everyday – because Cavell’s point is 
not merely that Idealism and the metaphysical act like a Medusa and block our access to the things 
that are important to us in everyday life (which is not an ‘‘especially surprising” point to make, Affeldt, 
2010: 282). Rather, it is that ‘‘I, as I stand, who do so. I do so recurrently, and I do so precisely 
through turning away from them toward philosophical emptiness” (Affeldt, 2010: 283). As noted 
earlier in relation to de Certeau, to say that we should embrace a reading of Wittgenstein that returns 
us to the rough ground is then hardly therapeutic, because a failure to engage the contesting 
dimensions of scepticism, exile and finitude still ‘‘leaves me a mystery to myself” (Affeldt, 2010: 86). 
Once again then, whilst of course the metaphysical amounts to a turning away from the everyday, 
the questions still remain: why should one have wanted to embrace philosophical emptiness and 
the metaphysical in the first place? Under what conditions of injustice, pain, suffering and other 
contexts did this impulse, impasse and exile emerge? How can such conditions be addressed even 
as we find ourselves on the rough ground? 
 
In surely one of the most important engagements with Wittgenstein in Human Geography to date, 
Harrison (2002: 496) sometimes appears to get close to this reading of Wittgenstein when he talks 
about how Philosophical Investigations ‘‘never settles once and for all, never finally comes to rest”. 
But rather than associate this restlessness with a therapeutic approach that still firmly keeps 
scepticism in play, as I have just been discussing, Harrison’s critique is instead levelled at the 
abstract rule-follower of Ideals and social conventions; so as to turn us toward the 
nonrepresentational and performative nature of rules instead. It is then surprising, given how 
scepticism is not engaged, that Harrison actually ends his paper with a powerful example of 
scepticism in the work of the anthropologist Veena Das. For whilst Harrison sees Das’ work as 
illustrative of a non-representational approach, he does not acknowledge that Das herself puts 
Cavell’s reading of the sceptical problem at the heart of her understanding of the everyday. Harrison 
(2002: 501) quotes Das at some length with regard to her anthropological accounts of violence 
against women in India: 
 
‘‘what is unique about pain is the absence of any standing languages either in society or in the 
social sciences that could communicate pain, yet it would be a mistake to think of pain as 
essentially incommunicable. At stake here is not the asymmetry between the first person (‘I am 
never in any doubt about my pain’) and the third person (‘you can never be certain about another 
person’s pain’), but rather that to locate pain I have to take the absence of standing language as 
part of the grammar of pain. To say ‘I am in pain’ is to ask for acknowledgment from the other 
just as a denial of another’s pain is not an intellectual failure but a spiritual failure, one that puts 
our future at stake.” 
 
Das’ then still very much keeps scepticism in play; explicitly. Indeed, as she repeatedly says in her 
work, it is precisely one of her central concerns as an Anthropologist that ‘‘both the temptations and 
threats of scepticism are taken out from the study of the philosopher and reformulated as questions 
about what it is to live in the face of the unknowability of the world (for my purposes especially the 
social world)” (Das, 1998: 183–184; Das, 2007). In a more recent paper Harrison (2007: 602) raises 
the related and salient question that how we understand the breakdown or failure of communication 
‘‘comes down to how we hear or hearken to the failure of representation and how we let this resound 
through our theories and account”. Given the concerns just raised, this is an extremely important 
observation to make. For both the NRT of Thrift (2004) and Cavell (2005b), a passionate utterance 
like a cry is an invitation to explore the limits of representation, and, therefore, can be thought of as 
a type of experimentation. As Cavell (2005b:185) says, a ‘‘passionate utterance is an invitation to 
improvisation in the disorders of desire”. But in Cavell’s case (2005b: 185) most explicitly, because 
passionate utterances demonstrate a weakness in the security of what could be called ‘‘public” or 
ordinary language, as I explained earlier, then they (can) also work to further switch the register of 
acknowledgment toward the idea of the ‘‘private” individual. This is not the same as saying that 
there is such a thing as a ‘private language’, but rather that a passionate utterance (can) direct our 
attention toward the sense of an ‘‘I”, and, therefore, to how people’s very sense of self and relation 
to the world is now in jeopardy (Cavell, 2005b:184). The draw of this essence – this ‘I’ – which often 
manifests in Cavell’s (1996a, 2003b, 2005b, 2005c, 2010a, 2010b) recurrent interest in the human 
soul, becomes ‘‘something like the absence of the experience, or distinctiveness of the word that is 
required, but also something like its being called forth by (the experience of) the reality of what it 
conceptualizes...” (Cavell, 2010a: 95, emphasis in original). Here Cavell’s move is both distinctive 
and powerful because it reveals how only focusing upon the performative nature of language and 
representations, or the affective power of the non-representational, for examples, does not seem to 
go far enough in also keeping in play how ‘‘[e]ssence is expressed by grammar” as well 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: §371). This is not to say bluntly that NRT or performative theory has it ‘wrong’. 
Rather, I would prefer to say that a Cavellian reworking of scepticism expands the critical register 
beyond the affective power of the non-representational and performative practices, to also vitally 
incorporate how the sceptical impulse, which, for Cavell (2003b), is intrinsic to the human form of 
life, works through everyday relations as well (see also Emerson’s (2000) ‘Self Reliance’ and 
Nietzsche’s (2003) ‘philosopher the day after tomorrow’). This argument in favour of scepticism 
may, of course, be precisely the problem for some who support NRT. Although Harrison’s (2007, 
2009) more recent work does seem to open up more possibilities, given the lack of explicit 
engagement with Cavell here, and more generally in Human Geography, I leave these hopefully for 
future debate. 
 
 
5. Affect theory and Cavell 
 
In a recent paper Linda Zerilli (2015) has also brought Wittgenstein and Cavell into touch with an 
often closely associated field of study to NRT in Human Geography, that of affect theory. Like Zerilli, 
here I shall focus mainly upon that Deleuzian strand of affect theory which is most influential in 
Human Geography associated with writers including Connolly (2006), Massumi (2015), Thrift (2008) 
and Berardi (2009). But I will also develop the argument in a different way from Zerilli by maintaining 
my own concern with the importance of scepticism in Cavell, as well as linking the discussion back 
to explicit synergies between Cavell and another sort of affect theory done by Lauren Berlant. 
 
Affect theorists like Connolly, Massumi and Berardi understand affect as the raw material of 
becoming and play of substances (that is, ontology). They often draw upon an understanding of 
affect developed by Spinoza, defined as ‘‘the modifications of the body by which the power of action 
of the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the idea of these 
modifications” (quoted in Thrift, 2004: 62). Affect then is prepersonal, proceeding directly from and 
between bodies. In their work Massumi, Connolly and Berardi have been particularly interested in 
borrowing from, among other sources, biological and neurological models to explore this 
understanding of pre-personal affect as the intensification of body-mind-culture relays under 
contemporary forms of capitalism (Papoulias and Callard, 2010). Seen in such terms, contemporary 
crises in capitalism are not only economic but also affective. Indeed, for Massumi (2015: 1–2), ‘‘the 
economy is best understood as a division of the affective arts.” But this strand of affect theory has 
also attracted important criticisms as well. For example, Berlant (2011: 15) says that there can be 
a tendency in some strands of affect theory to see ‘‘neoliberalism” as a ‘‘world-homogenizing 
sovereign with coherent intentions that produces subjects who serve its interests.” Berlant (2011: 
15) argues that in Berardi ‘‘singular actions only ever seem personal, effective, and freely 
intentional, whilst really being effects of powerful, impersonal forces”. Similarly, Barnett (2008: 188, 
emphasis in original) develops an extensive criticism of what has come to be known as this ‘‘layer-
cake” interpretation of affect: 
 
‘‘Layer-cake interpretations present propositional intentionality as resting upon a more basic level 
of pre-conceptual, practical intentionality in such a way as to present propositional intentionality 
as derivative of this layer of practical attunement (Brandom, 2002, 328). On this view, the practical 
presupposition of the available, ready-at-hand qualities of environments in embodied actions that 
treat these environments as merely occurrent, or present-at-hand, is interpreted as implying an 
order of conceptual priority of the practical (Brandom, 2002, 332). This model of conceptual 
priority puts in place a view of practical attunement as a stratum that is autonomous of 
propositional intentionality. It is treated as a layer that ‘could be in place before, or otherwise in 
the absence of the particular linguistic practices that permit anything to show up or be represented 
as merely there’. Brandom, 2002, 80” 
 
Quoting Barnett at some length in her own paper, Zerilli (2015: 282) says that this poses some 
real problems for affect theorists. On the one hand, Zerrili (2015: 282) says, affect theory too often 
makes a straw man out of conceptual rationality in order to knock it down, reducing it to 
‘‘conceptually determined responses”, rather than Wittgenstein’s more performative understanding 
of rulefollowing. But on the other hand, certain strands of affect theory need to be equally careful 
about reducing everything to ‘‘affectively primed responses” as well (Zerilli, 2015: 282; Barnett, 
2008; Rekret, 2016). Zerilli thus asks a pertinent question about whether there is a way to stop such 
concerns from sliding too far one way or the other. In response, I would say that there is in the work 
of the Cavellian-inspired affect theorist, Lauren Berlant, which, in my opinion, is a form of affect 
theory that goes quite some way to addressing such concerns. Notable here is Berlant’s (2011: 
260) influential book for Human Geographers, Cruel Optimism, in which Berlant says that she 
explicitly develops a ‘‘Cavellian ethics”. In many ways I see Berlant as bringing Cavell into the 
contemporary era. Like Cavell, Berlant is a philosopher of the Ideal. But neither makes straw men 
out of Ideals and thinks of then as essentialised, totalitarian and deterministic narratives, but rather 
understands Ideals for what they are – reflective of a sense of absence or impasse in the present 
and human sociality associated with the affective force of a fantasy that nevertheless sustains us 
in everyday life. Specifically, in Cruel Optimism Berlant (2011:4) explores how contemporary North 
Americans and Europeans often live life in an ongoing state of what she calls ‘‘impasse”, frequently 
characterised by a lurching between waxing and waning Ideals and fantasies of the good life amid 
heightening precarity and uncertainty. Like Cavell, Berlant (2011) is thus centrally concerned with 
the affective force and pressure of Ideals in the present – in her case, anything from the fantasy 
that a chocolate bar or a career will give us the good life, through to our attachments to the waning 
collectivity of the welfare state. In her more recent and fascinating book, Sex, or the Unbearable, 
co-written with Lee Edelman (Berlant and Edelman, 2013), Berlant really develops this concern for 
how people sustain cruel optimism in fantasies of sovereign mastery over everyday situations (as 
in psychanalytic theory), but also in the forms of uncertain intuition, intimacy, affinity, agency and 
solidarity that can emerge when people have a different relation to their own nonsovereignty (one 
that treats nonsovereignty as an affective space of feelings things out). Whilst this is not the place 
to elaborate in detail, in response to Zerilli’s call for a different sort of affect theory, it then very much 
seems to me that Berlant’s Cavellian-inspired affect theory effectively maintains that tension 
between the fantasy of mastery over everyday life, on the one hand, and the decompositional forces 
of affect on the other. Like Cavell, Berlant is interested in what the affective force of the Ideal and 
fantasy does in the present, but also how it decomposes and works its way through relations of 
acknowledgment, or otherwise, in everyday lives. Both are interested in what the recurrent turn to 
the affective form of Ideals does in the plane of the ordinary. This is obviously not to deny the 
differences between Berlant and Cavell as well, but to more generally flag up how both have similar 
tendencies in the examples they employ – from Shakespeare’s plays in Cavell (2003a), to 
contemporary poems about living in the suburbs in Berlant (2011) – to characterise the everyday 
as a scene of negotiated suspension whilst remaining affectively attached to fantasies of mastery 
and Ideals. 
 
 
6. Psychoanalysis, pragmatism and Cavellian moral perfectionism 
 
Such concerns bring me to the final connection I want to make: between Cavell and the reception 
of psychoanalysis in Human Geography. In particular, I will consider how Cavell’s work aligns well 
with Felicity Callard’s (2003: 295) seminal critique of how psychoanalysis has been read in Human 
Geography entitled The Taming of Psychoanalysis in Geography. As Callard (2003: 295) says, 
whilst in his own writing Freud’s formulation of the unconscious seems to largely foreground ‘‘inertia 
and repetition”, by contrast, in Human Geography it has often been invoked to bolster 
understandings of ‘‘progressive transformation” and political resistance. Callard’s criticism is that 
psychoanalysis has been too easily appropriated in Human Geography in the services of social 
constructivism and political resistance, at the expense of Freud’s more consistent emphasis upon 
states of impasse, suspension and lassitude (a criticism which I now also take seriously with regard 
to my own previous work, Pugh, 2005). As Callard (2003: 299, emphasis in original) says: 
 
‘‘Most obviously, and of most significance for the direction in which psychoanalytic geography is 
moving, this has meant rendering psychoanalysis compatible with a critical-geographical 
framework characterised theoretically by assimilated versions of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, 
and certain kinds of anti-essentialist feminist and critical race theory. Such a framework ... 
operates with a curiously idealized model of subjectivity and of politics—even when that 
framework is used to attend to the unruly sphere of the psyche, and hence, apparently, to the 
unconscious”. 
 
For Callard (2003: 307), in contrast to this social constructivist and political resistance trend in 
critical Human Geography, Freud forces a ‘‘confrontation with a psyche deeply antagonistic toward 
change; individuals trapped in the repetition, rather than the supersession, of traumatic formations 
...”. There are strong overlaps here between Callard and Cavell’s approach. In Cavell’s (1990) 
reading of Ibsen’s play A Doll’s House, for example, Cavell focuses upon how psychic trauma, 
scepticism and injustice work through one of the central characters, Nora, recounting to her 
oppressive husband the vast range of terms through which her everyday sense of alienation is 
constituted (as both a wife and a woman in society more generally). She recounts a whole range of 
everyday concepts – from conversation, education and happiness, to becoming human, becoming 
strangers, and honour. For Cavell (1996a: 332), this recounting draws attention to how an approach 
to scepticism and the everyday parallels with psychoanalysis, so that in both 
 
‘‘[t]he practice of the ordinary may be thought of as the overcoming of iteration or replication or 
imitation by repetition, of counting by recounting, of calling by recalling. It is the familiar invaded 
by another familiar. Hence ordinary language procedures, like the procedures of psychoanalysis, 
inherently partake of the uncanny.” 
 
In Nora, through her act of recounting her relation to the everyday, there is this uncanny sense of 
someone standing beside herself (of a familiar life being invaded by an as yet unattained self). But 
the question is not so much one of resistance outwards or upwards, at least not as this is often 
formulated in the critical resistance literature; as of scepticism, like psychoanalysis, being the 
‘‘discovery of the everyday”, which may be a deeply troubling and unruly experience (Cavell, 1988: 
170). Nora recalls the ordinary terms of her daily existence in relation to her oppressive husband 
and wider society, and in so doing the quotidian is revealed as strange, the everyday fantastical 
and we are faced with what Cavell (1988: 153) calls the ‘‘uncanniness of the ordinary.” As the play 
develops further, Nora walks into another room on her own, whilst Torvald shouts from outside the 
door that he now forgives her outburst. When Nora reappears Torvald says ‘‘You’ve changed your 
clothes”. Nora replies ‘‘Yes, Torvald, I’ve changed” (quoted in Cavell, 1990: 111). The central 
question in this play is thus what Callard (2003: 308) would perhaps call ‘‘intransigence in the very 
process of transformation”; or, as Cavell (1996a: 330–331) would say, those who undergo such a 
‘‘transfiguration” as Nora are apt to ‘‘make themselves wilfully difficult to understand”. Moral 
justifications have come to an end, and justice, as it stands, has done what it can. Nora has not only 
reached an intransigence with Torvald, but also herself and the wider society that she lives in. But 
the direction of her associated transfiguration is not up toward any predefined goal or star of 
articulable alternative resistance, but instead down, into the living impasse of what Cavell (1996a: 
332) calls ‘‘the chain of a day’s denial.” What is radical here, I contend, is then to acknowledge the 
pressure of one’s own separateness and finitude, others and society more broadly as it stands; to 
feel the illusionary, artificial and trance-like qualities of the everyday as this lived experience; but, 
equally importantly, to not then return back to this rough ground, but to find oneself transfigured by 
the intransigence. 
 
Finally then, whatever else Cavell’s philosophical tradition is, it is not pragmatism. The recurrent 
impasses and uncanny feelings of nextness keep pragmatism too much at bay. If someone tells 
you ‘be pragmatic’ what they are in effect telling you is not to dwell too much on feelings of 
scepticism, impasse and doubt, but to somehow get on with it all, adapt, adjust and move on. Whilst 
the founding fathers of North American pragmatism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century – including William James, John Dewey and Charles Peirce – emphasised ‘‘the primacy of 
practice”, as Cavell (2003b: 221) says, the philosophical tradition of pragmatism does ‘‘not take 
scepticism seriously”. Indeed, for Cavell, right from the birth of the pragmatic tradition, in William 
James’ influential text The Varieties of Religious Experience, scepticism was relegated to an illness 
that James famously called the ‘‘sick soul” (1902/2002:99). As Cavell (2003b: 221) says, ‘‘James 
perceives the condition [of scepticism] as being of a particular” condition; so that the sick soul is not 
present in those who have a ‘‘healthy-minded temperament”. Like social constructivism, 
pragmatism is a tradition recurrently engaged in Human Geography and related disciplines 
(Forester, 1993; Sunley, 1996; Bridge, 2008; Jones, 2008; Coaffee and Headlam, 2008; Barnes, 
2008; Healey, 2009). One understands the pull for those interested in questions of resistance and 
moving on from oppression (Wills and Lake, 2017). But here, like Cavell, I also encourage us to 
step one generation back from pragmatism, to the Godfather of William James, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. Indeed, Cavell (1990, 1996a, 2003b, 2013) often reads Emerson alongside Wittgenstein 
and situates both at the head of a different philosophical lineage which he calls Moral Perfectionism. 
Others he includes in this tradition are Thoreau, Nietzsche and the Romantic poets Wordsworth, 
Coleridge and Blake. Cavell (2013: 5) sees Moral Perfectionism as a ‘‘continuation with 
romanticism”, because, like the Romantic poetics, Emerson and Thoreau also tended to posit a 
feeling of distance and nextness to everyday life brought about by a desire to fully grasp the 
everyday and bring it closer (and the associated romantic failure of loss in not being able to do so). 
Those Cavell includes in the lineage of Moral Perfectionism often start by foregrounding 
experiences of embarrassment and disappointment with their culture as a whole, a sense of 
distance from the everyday; how one feels compromised by that culture and its inability to listen to 
itself and the individuals that make it up (as in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House, and Nora). This 
disappointment, in a way that Berlant2 also says includes her in the Emersonian tradition, is 
associated with the everyday as a scene of ongoing suspension and impasse that is coupled with 
an attachment to the affective force of an as yet unattained but attainable self – hence, perfectionism 
is kept in play. It is a philosophical tradition which does not eschew the impasse, but indeed 
foregrounds how people inhabit, dwell and feel out the contours of impasse as a lived experience. 
Indeed, as noted, for both Berlant and Cavell impasse becomes arguably the key orientating trope, 
and not the aside to be glossed over, even as it is maintained by everyday affective attachments to 
                                                                        
2 Berlant was asked this question by the author of this paper after her keynote presentation at the Emotional 
Geographies Conference, Edinburgh, June 10th, 2015. The question was posed in front of the audience and concerned 
whether or not Berlant sees herself as continuing the particular philosophical lineage developed by Emerson and Cavell. 
Her answer was yes. 
Ideals and associated decompositional pressures. As Berlant (2011) says, this all feels a very 
appropriate philosophical tradition to engage for our times. 
 
 
7. Conclusion: the eventual everyday 
 
The ‘everyday turn’ in the social sciences and humanities has largely downgraded concerns with 
the philosophical problem of scepticism. Despite a range of innovative perspectives – from de 
Certeau to contemporary critical Human Geography, affect theory and non-representational theory, 
psychoanalysis and pragmatism – one of the oldest questions of the Western philosophical tradition 
has now been almost completely expunged from our critical thinking about everyday life. Indeed, to 
even talk about scepticism today is to risk being ridiculed and held in check, as Rorty (2005) sought 
to check Cavell by saying that for the sake of pragmatism we should consign scepticism to a relic 
of the past. But as Cavell (2005a: 159) said in response to Rorty, so ‘‘[n]ow the question becomes 
how its preoccupations could ever have seemed to express our fundamental concerns about our 
relation to the world and I and others in it...” It just seems all too easy to say that much of the history 
of the Western Philosophical tradition – from Plato to Descartes, Hume and Kant – simply got it 
wrong. As Cavell (2005c) explains, whether in Wittgenstein’s (1953) approach to ‘philosophy’, 
Emerson’s (2000) ‘Self Reliance’, Thoreau’s (2010) ‘Civil Disobedience’ or Nietzsche’s (2003) 
‘philosopher the day after tomorrow’, being attentive to scepticism becomes a way of (re)turning to 
the everyday anew. For Cavell (2005a: 159) then, although scepticism should certainly be 
fundamentally reworked in new ways, it still remains important for how we come to acknowledge 
others in everyday life; in how we become ‘‘the dealer of those small deaths of everyday slights, 
stuttered hesitations of acknowledgment, studied reductions or misdirections of gratitude, that kill 
intimacy and maim social existence”. Scepticism here is not a mere aside to everyday life, relegated 
to the work of a Philosopher like Hume sat in his isolated study, who then forgets about its power 
when he goes out into the wider world with his friends (Cavell, 1988). Nor is scepticism reduced to 
an isolated expression of ‘‘unnatural doubts”, confined to the insane or possessed (Das, 2007: 6). 
It is also not a matter of only focusing upon how the unknowability of the social world has been 
made more acute by processes of modernity and globalization (as in Appadurai 1996: 158–78). But 
rather, as in the work of Cavell’s contemporary Veena Das (1998: 184), scepticism is about how 
the ‘‘uncertainty of relations is part of human sociality”. 
 
Despite being influential across many disciplines, Cavell is not only largely overlooked in Human 
Geography but also in many mainstream social science and humanities texts on ‘the everyday’. 
Indeed, both Cavell and Wittgenstein are notable omissions from Ben Highmore’s (2002) widely 
cited edited collection The Everyday Life Reader. The argument of this paper then is that 
contemporary critical theory on the everyday should return a little more than it does to some of 
these older philosophical questions and debates that Cavell keeps in play. In our seeming relentless 
fascination and appetite for ever-new ways of framing the everyday some old concerns are being 
too easily forgotten. In our thirst to explain the new, we expunge the sceptical problem of other 
minds and the external world too readily. Yet, as Cavell (2005a) says, contemporary life has not 
made this, one of the oldest philosophical problems, redundant. As in the cases of others in his 
Moral Perfectionist tradition, such as Emerson, Thoreau, Das and Berlant, in Cavell’s work 
scepticism and the drive for the transcendental is bound up in human sociality itself, a means of 
telling stories about trying to reconstruct community, as a worthy endeavour, not to be dismissed 
lightly. 
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